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Prospects for International
Gender Norms
Dianne Otto*
The Symposium, provocatively entitled After Gender?:
Examining International Justice Enterprises, held at Pace
University Law School, White Plains, New York, on November
12, 2010, was organized around four “conversations” between
selected participants and finished with a keynote presentation by
Janet Halley (Harvard).1 Prior to the Symposium, telephone
hook-ups were organized so that those involved in each of the four
conversations could identify some key questions that they would
discuss. I was one of the participants in Conversation 4, Prospects
for International Gender Norms, along with Ali Miller (Berkeley)
and Arminu Gamawa (Harvard SJD). With help from Darren
Rosenblum (Pace), Jillian Petrera (Pace student), and Janet
Halley, our panel identified three questions that provided a
framework for our discussions at the Symposium. These
questions are used here to provide a structure for my reflections.
What do you consider utopia for international gender
law, and what stands in the way of its realization?
In my early days as a critical/feminist scholar of
international law, an eminent professor, for whom I have great
admiration, blithely dismissed my research as “utopian.” The
implication was that it lacked practical applicability and/or that I
had flouted disciplinary conventions and boundaries—or worse,

* Professor of Law, Melbourne Law School, Director International Human
Rights Law Program Institute for International Law and the Humanities
(IILAH), and Project Director for Peacekeeping (Asia-Pacific Centre for Military
Law (APCML)).
1. For further information, see After Gender? Examining International
Justice Enterprises, PACE L. SCH., http://web.pace.edu/page.cfm?doc_id=35978
(last visited Aug. 2, 2011).
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that I did not understand them—which left me out of touch with
everyday reality and outside the bounds of academic credibility.
While I take the criticism that my work lacks applicability to
real-life everyday problems very seriously, I want to vigorously
resist the frame of thinking that enables such casual dismissal of
critical legal scholarship. Not only do I think that critique is an
important component of (practical) struggle in everyday life, but I
also reject the implied distinction being drawn between
mainstream academic inquiry as legitimate, and efforts to think
outside the box as somehow illegitimate. Why does critical
thinking so often attract the smear of “utopian” impracticality
and muddled thinking, rather than convey a sense of excitement
about what new ways of thinking might offer to familiar
conversations and discoveries? We need to think about what this
reveals about the relationship between contemporary forms of
global power and academic commitments to “rigor” and
“objectivity.”2
My own starting point is to associate utopianism with
hopefulness; with creating frames of thinking that make it
possible to imagine futures that are better than the present—less
oppressive, more equal, less militaristic, and more free. The
hopefulness that I would associate with feminist utopian thinking
in international law includes remapping political and legal
discursive spaces so that peace becomes not only thinkable, but
realizable; resituating grass roots, anti-war, women’s, and other
people’s movements so they are no longer marginalized and
dismissed as anachronistic, but embraced as the voice of the
people (like the protesters in Tahrir Square); and reconstituting
“gender” so that it is no longer a binary or a hierarchy, but hybrid
and multiplicitous. Thus, initially, the challenge to articulate a
vision of gender utopia in international law for this conversation
felt very attractive. I especially relished the opportunity to think
against the grain of the contemporary hostility to critical/feminist
thinking in international law that is asserted in the name of
2. This is a question that has inspired a great deal of feminist and critical
scholarship in the discipline of international law. For an early feminist example
see Hilary Charlesworth, Alienating Oscar? Feminist Analysis of International
Law, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 1-18
(Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993).
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maintaining unity in the face of the continuing crisis of terrorism
(you are either for us or against us).3 The conversations made
possible by this Symposium promised a much-needed break from
the hegemony of crisis-driven thinking as well as from the selfreferential conventions of the discipline.
Yet, once I sat down to put my “utopian” thoughts on paper, I
realized this task was as dangerous as any other project aimed at
radical change. My gender utopia was emerging as a curious
mixture of freedom and regulation/law. I want freedom, while I
also want systems that ensure the equitable distribution of
resources and wealth. I want peace, while I also want to engage
the violence of the law to oppose brutal and corrupt regimes. I
want gender egalitarianism, while I also want to enjoy the
pleasures of desire’s hierarchies. I asked around to see how others
thought of utopia. My Swedish PhD student wanted a world in
which consensus is not the preferred method of decision-making
(decidedly post-Swedish). My ninety-year-old poet friend, who
sheds tears of despondency every day about the state of the
world, told me this was a question that no longer interested her.
In answer to my next question about what questions were of
interest, she replied that they concerned how she could leave life
when she chose.
So I have come to think that utopian visions are much more
about our discontents with the present than about the “perfect”
world of the future.
Taking the lead from my student and poet friend, I found I
could be much more specific: in my present, I am concerned that
there is no frame for imagining what comes after the enterprise of
addressing sexual violence. I am concerned that the
institutionalization of feminist ideas, in international law and
politics, has divested them of their radical potential. I am also
concerned that the urge to think “after gender,” as much as the
idea excites me, may destroy the categories that so many of us
rely upon as springboards to our critiques of the present and our

3. See Dianne Otto, Remapping Crisis through a Feminist Lens, in
BETWEEN RESISTANCE AND COMPLIANCE? FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN AGE OF TERROR AND ANXIETY (Sari Kouvo & Zoe
Pearson eds., forthcoming 2011).
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imaginings of better futures.
Therefore my utopian vision is very much a response to the
immediate problems of the present as I see it, and the barriers
that stand in the way of addressing these problems include
academic isolation and myopia, the contemporary hegemony of
crisis law-making and global governance, the stubborn tenacity of
naturalized gender dualisms and the limits of my own thinking.
What is the most promising (recent) development in
international law?
Sadly, when reflecting on recent developments in
international law, I can find no evidence that peace has become
more thinkable, that anti-war and feminist movements have been
more widely embraced, or that the binary of gender has been
seriously disrupted. However, in my (constant) search for
“promising” signs of change, an endeavor in which I also try to
engage all my students, I find reassurance in Michel Foucault’s
observation, that “nothing is in itself evil, but everything is
dangerous,”4 by which I take him to mean that there is no
guarantee that any emancipatory strategy or action will be
entirely, or even partially, successful. And the same goes for
strategies aimed at repression and domination. Foucault’s idea of
“danger” here is comprised of both hopefulness and caution. It is a
reminder that, while pursuing opportunities is always risky,
there is no reason to assume that they cannot be turned to
progressive ends. This reassurance releases me from the
responsibility of finding the perfect (utopian) strategy for change.
Accepting that everything is liable to “go wrong,” while
everything may also in some way be amenable to progressive
change, encourages not only activism in the present but its
continuation into the future. It gives me confidence to work with
what is at hand; with what we know about the present and with
whatever our activism produces in the future. There is no
ultimate utopia, although there may indeed be “victories” to

4. Colin Gordon, Governmental Rationality: An Introduction, in THE
FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 1, 46-47 (Graham Burchell,
Colin Gordon & Peter Miller eds., 1991).
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cautiously celebrate along the way, just as there is no complete
failure. Dangerousness is a call to action, a challenge, rather than
an obstacle.
My interest in the dangerousness of feminist strategies in
international law has led me to examine the Security Council’s
flirtation with feminist ideas over the last decade.5 By the close of
2010, the Council had adopted five thematic resolutions on
“women, peace and security,” largely as a consequence of
concerted lobbying by feminist and human rights NGOs,6
although I have argued elsewhere that the quid pro quo has been
enabling the Council to claim a “gender legitimacy” which has
helped to arrest its flagging international authority.7
The first of these resolutions, Resolution 1325 (R1325),
adopted in 2000,8 took a very broad view of women’s issues in
armed conflict and post-conflict settings, including emphasizing
the importance of their participation in brokering peace and in
post-conflict reconstruction. This representation of women with
political agency marked a welcome departure from the Council’s
previous preoccupation with women as victims of sexual abuse,
although the notion of women as peace-makers, while pregnant
with possibilities, also draws on traditional naturalized gender
scripts. Eight years later, in 2008, the second resolution (R1820)9
focused solely on addressing sexual violence, and the document’s
single fleeting reference to women’s participation is buried in the
middle of its provisions.10 The resolution even suggests that the
Council may invoke its powers of collective use of force to address
widespread or systematic sexual violence,11 adopting the
increasingly familiar tactic of coopting feminist concerns to justify
5. Dianne Otto, A Sign of “Weakness”? Disrupting Gender Certainties in the
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
113 (2006).
6. See NGO WORKING GROUP ON WOMEN, PEACE & SECURITY,
http://womenpeacesecurity.org/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2011).
7. Dianne Otto, The Security Council’s Alliance of Gender Legitimacy: The
Symbolic Capital of Resolution 1325, in FAULT LINES OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGITIMACY 239 (Hilary Charlesworth & Jean-Marc Coicaud eds., 2010).
8. S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).
9. S.C. Res. 1820, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008).
10. Id. ¶ 12, at 2.
11. Id. ¶ 1, at 1.
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changing the law, in this case the laws of war (jus in bello) which
have, at least since 1945, limited the legal triggers for
international armed conflict to cases of self-defense. The R1820
also suggests that women and girls may be evacuated to safety if
they are facing an imminent threat of sexual violence,12 elevating
sexual violence victims to the position of “most deserving” or
“most vulnerable” victims of armed conflict. Who is not injured
enough to be included in the evacuation queue? Men and boys
who are facing imminent sexual violence; women facing an
imminent, but non-sexual, threat to their lives; children needing
urgent evacuation for medical care.
Even so, hidden away in paragraph three of R1820 is a
promising development. The paragraph lists steps that parties to
armed conflict must take to protect civilians from all forms of
sexual violence, including “debunking myths that fuel sexual
violence.” This is definitely a productive moment of feminist
possibility, bursting with opportunities for activism. The
provision acknowledges that sexual violence is not a natural
expression of masculinity—not even in the context of armed
conflict. It recognizes that sexual violence is made possible by
discursive social and cultural norms and practices that can be
debunked. So R1820 is a classic example of the dangerousness of
feminist engagement with international law—on the one hand,
gender is taken up as a totalizing dichotomy that operates so that
women and girls are always in the most disadvantaged position,
which invites and justifies protective responses, while on the
other hand it presents the opportunity to actively dismantle
gendered mythologies about sexual violence.
Resolution 1888 (R1888),13 the third in the series of thematic
resolutions on women, peace, and security, also focuses solely on
sexual violence. However, a close reading reveals that the
resolution embraces a wider selection of feminist ideas than
R1820, notably making no reference to evacuating sexual violence
victims, although it retains the suggestion that armed force can
be employed as a response to sexual violence. The R1888 retains
the language of “debunking myths” and establishes several
12. Id. ¶ 3, at 1.
13. S.C. Res. 1888, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1888 (Sept. 30, 2009).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/7

6

2011]

PROSPECTS FOR INTERNATIONAL NORMS

879

accountability mechanisms14 which, in terms of promise, are of
course dangerous. They threaten to reinforce the idea that the
feminist agenda in international law is concerned primarily or
even solely with sexual violence, while they also open the
possibility that sexual violence may yet function as a stepping
stone to a broader feminist/gender agenda.
The fourth resolution, Resolution 1889 (R1889),15 adopted
just five days after R1888, reinvigorates the wider agenda of
R1325. It reiterates the importance of women’s participation at
all stages of peace processes and in post-conflict peace-building.
While the danger remains that this may end up simply
reinforcing
stereotyped
notions
of
women’s
inherent
predisposition to pacifism, the language also enables a more fluid
reading with its call for “supporting women’s organizations and
countering negative social attitudes about women’s capacity to
participate equally.”16 Significantly, R1889 also recognizes the
need to improve women’s socio-economic conditions in postconflict situations17 and ensure that girls have equal access to
education.18 There is even a hint of “sexual positivity” with the
inclusion of the need to ensure women’s access to health services
“including sexual and reproductive health and reproductive
rights.”19
While my earlier assessment, following the adoption of R1820
(the second resolution), was that these resolutions were indicative
of a broader trend in international law, wherein the feminist
project was losing ground even as many were celebrating its
victories,20 the third and fourth resolutions have served as a
reminder of Foucault’s caution that nothing is ever completely
“good” or “bad.” The fifth and most recent addition to this series
14. These mechanisms include the appointment of a Special Representative
of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict and a team of
experts to be deployed rapidly to situations of particular concern in order to help
national authorities respond to sexual violence.
15. S.C. Res 1889, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1889 (Oct. 5, 2009).
16. Id. ¶ 1, at 3.
17. Id. ¶ 10, at 4.
18. Id. ¶ 11, at 4.
19. Id. ¶ 10, at 4.
20. Dianne Otto, The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues in
International Law over the Last Decade, 10 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 11, 15 (2009).
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of thematic resolution, Resolution 1960 (R1960),21 has been
adopted since the Pace Symposium concluded, and is again
preoccupied with sexual violence, which has made me wonder
whether these reflections are perhaps too optimistic and to
contemplate again the idea that the feminist enterprise is losing
ground. Yet it remains the case that the genealogy of these
resolutions shows that international legal texts do not freeze
ideas in time or completely contain them—not even resolutions of
the super-power dominated Security Council. Instead, they create
dangerous spaces that enable progressive interpretations and
applications of the text, and open further possibilities for feminist
engagement with power. The genealogy also shows how crucial
both activism and scholarly critique (utopian thinking?) are to
seeing these opportunities in order to take them up in a practical
way.
What is the relationship between the conceptual goals
discussed in response to questions one and two and
pragmatism and incrementalism?
It is interesting to note, in retrospect, that the questions we
asked of ourselves also assumed a gap between utopian thinking
and practical application, like my eminent colleague. Although, in
our defense, we were also assuming that a relationship can be
forged. It is safe to say that there was little doubt in the minds of
those of us at the Symposium that genders are multiple and that
unsettling the naturalized duality of gender can create new
relational contexts and possibilities. However, Foucault reminds
us that we can never be sure that such troubling will lead to
progressive social change. This reminder is not meant to deter,
but to emphasize the symbiotic relationship between activism and
critique, between imagination and practice. We need to find ways
to open deep spaces for the expression of ideas and the exercise of
freedoms, and utopian thinking can help. As legal scholars, our
particular challenge is how to create and utilize these spaces in
the hegemonic languages and practices of international law and
nation states.
21. S.C. Res 1960, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1960 (Dec. 16, 2010).
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These reflections lead me finally to be able to articulate the
question at the heart of my vision of “utopia” in international
gender law, which is: what kind of gendered and sexed world can
give life to the most people? By “life” I mean a life that is fully
recognized by law and politically engaged—not the “bare life” that
Agamben so compellingly warns is becoming normative.22 We
need to consider how far feminist analysis—including sex
positive/queer feminism—can take us towards this goal, be alert
to blind spots and dystopian tendencies, and remain open to the
possibilities of thinking “after gender.” We could start by moving
the feminist project in international law beyond sexual violence.
Just as I refused the professor’s dismissal of feminist visions
of international law as impractical many years ago, it is perhaps
even more important today to make connections between utopian
conjectures and the realities of the present. Those conjectures can
form a window of very practical hope in a time of walled
protectionism and heavily policed thinking.

22. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER
(Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford University Press 1998).
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